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Farm and Quarry or Smart State?
Queensland’s Economy Since 1989
Chris Salisbury
A generation ago, Queensland’s economy relied heavily — as did the standing of
the state government — upon a booming resources sector, a bountiful agricultural
sector and a still-growing tourist market. ‘Rocks and crops’ (to use a favourite
phrase of Peter Beattie’s) were mainstays of the state’s economic activity, and had
long underpinned the government’s investment, development and budgetary plan-
ning. While to a large extent the same might be said today, critical changes have
taken place in the local economy in the intervening period, cultivated by succes-
sive state administrations with the express aim of diversifying an economy that
was overwhelmingly geared towards primary production. Now it can be argued
that Queensland’s economy has metamorphosed into a modern, knowledge-based
economy that demands greater emphasis on technology, expertise and innovation
— what Premier Peter Beattie liked to promote with his catch-all phrase ‘Smart
State’. But how effective was this push for diversification in renewing the state’s
economic foundations? Since the advent of the Goss Labor government in late
1989, has Queensland really moved from a ‘farm and quarry’ to a ‘smart’
economy?
It was long supposed that if Australia rode to prosperity on the sheep’s back,
then in Queensland the rider carried a mining pick in one hand and a cane knife
in the other. This rather fanciful image was at no time more readily imagined than
in the latter half of the twentieth century, when the state actively promoted itself
as a vast landscape of unbridled opportunity for pioneering investors — terra
nullius on a grand scale. Unsurprisingly, the invitation was accepted by a number
of enthusiastic speculators from both Australia and, increasingly, overseas. The
result for Queensland was an enhanced reputation as a bucolic paradise of abun-
dant natural riches, and a state where agricultural production and resource
extraction were foremost among the economic priorities of the government of the
day — regardless of its political persuasion (Wadley 1993, p. 98). It is no accident
that the state’s coat of arms — initiated in Queen Victoria’s time but only settled
in its current form during the 1977 visit of Queen Elizabeth II — should so
prominently feature the recognisable emblems of mining and pastoral pursuits.
Throughout much of the twentieth century, Queensland embodied those images.
As the 1970s and 1980s progressed, and the more deeply the Bjelke-Petersen
regime was entrenched (and the more those cranes rose on city skylines), the
happier the Queensland government seemed to be with this rapid-growth, devel-
opment-intensive state of affairs. Then and since, criticisms were levelled at the
Bjelke-Petersen government that too much of Queensland’s natural wealth was
exploited with insufficient return to the state, from open-cut coal mines to high-
rise apartments on the Gold Coast (Evans 2007, pp. 241–42; Fitzgerald,
Megarrity and Symons 2009, pp. 150–52, 155–56).
The replacement of National Party Premier Mike Ahern by his former Police
Minister, Russell Cooper, in late 1989 hastened the party’s electoral fall from
grace for the first time in over 32 years. This spectacular fall ushered in a rejuve-
nated Labor government with a young Premier who was in only his second year
of leading the party. Wayne Goss went to the December 1989 state election
vowing to ‘sweep away the cobwebs’, not only of the decades of by then corrup-
tion-tainted conservative rule, but also of a state economy that had become
rooted in the Coalition government’s attachment to agricultural and mining activ-
ity as drivers of economic growth (Ryan 1993, pp. 161–62). Ironically, Ahern had
begun planning for a strategic realignment of the state’s economic activities
during his relatively short term as Premier. Despite having earlier described the
state’s mining and agricultural sectors as traditionally ‘the engines of growth’, he
foresaw a time when Queensland’s economy would ‘mature’ and these sectors
would decline (Ahern 1985, p. 22).
When the new Treasurer, Keith De Lacy, presented his budget papers to the
parliament in September 1990, he made it clear that Labor’s overworked broom
had been busy at its task in the Treasury’s corridors as well: ‘This government is
placing considerable emphasis in its economic policies on the need to expand
value-adding activities which make a greater contribution to economic growth’
(Queensland Parliament 1990, p. 3578). Moves were afoot to shift the economic
focus from what former Treasury Under-Secretary Leo Hielscher described
recently as the Bjelke-Petersen government’s predilection for development of the
state’s resources (Centre for the Government of Queensland 2011). Here, then,
was a clear marker of difference in economic policy between Goss’s government
and those preceding it. Whereas Bjelke-Petersen seemed content for interests
outside the state to make the ‘down-the-line’ profits on crops and resources, his
successors determined that more of the valuable processing and manufacturing
activity should take place locally — hence the move towards greater state invest-
ment in education, and especially skills training. Goss nurtured the seeds of
coordinated, strategic economic planning established by Ahern, which later
became manifest in the Goss government’s ‘Leading State’ vision statement.
Devised by Goss’s core advisers in the Premier’s Department, this far-reaching
policy document greatly expanded the foundations of administrative coordination
and economic diversity inherent in Ahern’s own strategic document, ‘Quality
Queensland’. Like this earlier strategy, Goss’s plan was a blueprint for long-term
economic planning that would begin the slow but steady revitalisation of
Queensland’s economy and establish a lasting legacy of post-Bjelke-Petersen
administrative reform (Ryan 1993, pp. 162–64).
Significantly, De Lacy mentioned in his maiden budget speech that the new
government looked to perform a delicate political balancing act, whereby eco-
nomic reform and fiscal responsibility were as much priorities as strong economic
growth. Presumably, with the methodical principles of the ‘Leading State’ plat-
form to guide the government, one would lead to the other. Ultimately, though,
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with national and international economic conditions in the early to mid-1990s
doing the Queensland government few favours, this goal proved too hard a task
even for the ‘herculean’ Goss and his willing Labor team. Goss admitted as much
when interviewed, noting wryly: ‘We had a big reform agenda but we came into
government right in the middle of the “recession we had to have”, and that made
life very hard.’ (Centre for the Government of Queensland 2011) He further
lamented that, during his term as Premier, Queensland was still ‘down the eco-
nomic food chain’. 
Despite the Goss government’s worthy attempts to attract new businesses and
industries to establish themselves here, by way of tax concessions and other finan-
cial inducements, sadly Queensland remained little more than a ‘branch office
state’ (Reynolds 2002, pp. 75–76; Wanna 2003, pp. 377–79). This situation was
compounded by independent local law and accounting firms, for instance, amal-
gamating and then being run out of Sydney or Melbourne. Yet Goss recognised
that such efforts on the part of government to lift the state’s economic profile
were integral to maximising economic activity and development in Queensland.
This point has been echoed by some who served as Treasurers in later administra-
tions, including Joan Sheldon (Liberal) and David Hamill and Terry Mackenroth
(Labor); interestingly, they each noted that Queensland’s perceived status as a
‘low-tax state’, and especially the introduction of the Howard government’s
Goods and Services Tax (GST) helped greatly in this regard (Centre for the
Government of Queensland 2011).
It is noteworthy that Queensland’s annual portion of GST revenue increased in
the last six years of Peter Beattie’s government from $845 million to $1.25 billion;
this represents an increase in that time of 47.5 per cent compared with New
South Wales’ share of 26.5 per cent (ABS 2011b). The states’ increased taxation
revenue share (without necessarily having to increase state taxes) allowed govern-
ments from this time to implement programs and spending commitments
previously considered unaffordable, both financially and politically. Indeed, Peter
Beattie, with uncharacteristic under-statement, confirmed as much when he com-
mented: ‘We did pretty well out of the GST.’ (Centre for the Government of
Queensland 2011)
Following Labor’s brief loss of government in 1996, Rob Borbidge’s Coalition
continued to drive new and diverse economic activity in Queensland (Fitzgerald,
Megarrity and Symons 2009, p. 213). The Borbidge administration, while ham-
pered by its minority government status, still managed to entice large firms such
as Boeing to set up shop in Queensland, thereby kick-starting a new and still
thriving sector of aviation and associated services. By and large, Borbidge’s gov-
ernment avoided the pitfalls of falling into old Coalition habits of merely ‘opening
up the farm gates’, and even followed its predecessors’ leads with its own eco-
nomic development strategy, the unimaginatively titled ‘State Strategic Plan’.
Whatever the merits of Borbidge’s plans, he suffered a similar fate to his former
colleague, Mike Ahern, in serving too short a term as Premier to fully implement
any long-lasting changes to Queensland’s economic base. This problem would
not, as it turned out, beset his immediate successor, with Peter Beattie taking the
state’s reins in mid-1998 and not relinquishing them until his resignation some
nine years later.
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When Beattie arrived in the Premier’s office, he found Queensland in reason-
able economic shape, having all but emerged from the gloom of recessionary
conditions. However, the late 1990s Asian economic crisis caused further instabil-
ity in this part of the region and — tied to the damage being wrought on this
state’s image by the One Nation movement, widely derided in the other states as a
Queensland phenomenon — made for continuing financial uncertainty (Evans
2007, pp. 257–60). Added to this for Beattie was the precarious nature of his own
new administration, which by virtue of the 1998 poll result had left Queensland
in the care of another minority government (at least for its first six months).
Undeterred, Beattie famously exhorted his Labor team to govern as if it had a par-
liamentary majority of ten. This audacious leadership ploy emboldened his core
policy advisers, who shortly thereafter produced the first version of what came to
be known — with Beattie’s trademark ‘everyman’ touch — as the ‘Smart State’
strategy. Another in the line of coordinated, strategic economic agendas, this
vision statement had many architects in government — including public service
fellow travellers — but was championed relentlessly by none more than Beattie
himself. Of course, not every Queenslander warmed to or even understood the
government’s strategy, and Beattie certainly faced trenchant criticism in parlia-
ment from a cynical and mocking opposition. But licence plate debacles and
interstate jibes aside, Beattie stuck to his guns (which became far easier after
Labor’s landslide 2001 election victory) and won grudging acknowledgement
from the news media in doing so (see Connolly 2002).
Ostensibly, Beattie introduced Smart State to diversify Queensland’s economy
and generate more jobs in new industries. After making his seemingly fanciful
pledge to reduce the state’s unemployment figure to below 5 per cent, the
Premier needed a plan to make it happen; in Smart State, he had that plan.
While the strategy never set out to abandon the ‘rocks and crops’ sectors
(Beattie 2005, pp. 248–49; Queensland Parliament 2004, pp. 1863–64), it
uniquely drew on partnerships with the state’s universities and new businesses
to develop ‘smarter’, more innovative ways of conducting primary production,
mineral extraction and even power generation. It mattered little that some of
the strategy’s key principles and policies were, in all likelihood, recycled ver-
sions of pre-existing government programs. Through attracting those businesses
— the likes of Virgin Airlines and IBM — new industry sectors (ICT and
biotechnology) and existing sectors (tourism and manufacturing) were boosted
or rejuvenated. New business investment, which more than doubled in the last
five years of Beattie’s government to almost $30 billion, drove an employment
growth rate that at roughly 4 per cent was routinely twice the national average
in the same time. In the 20 years to the end of the Beattie era, Queensland’s
population growth averaged 2.2 per cent (double the rate for the rest of the
nation), with many people probably attracted by the state’s expanding employ-
ment opportunities. Consumer demand and expenditure, along with public
investment in infrastructure, predictably rose in line with population growth
(OESR 2007, pp. 1–2). As a result, Queensland’s economy continued to grow
above the national average and, importantly, had greater capacity to grow
(Fitzgerald, Megarrity and Symons 2009, pp. 244–45, 263–64). Even Beattie’s
former Deputy Premier, Terry Mackenroth — no great admirer of the ‘flashy’
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slogan — has conceded that ‘Smart State has really added a lot to the economy
of Queensland’ (Centre for the Government of Queensland 2011).
It has long been the case that Queensland’s economic growth has out-
performed the combined economic performance of the rest of the country, but
that differential has not diminished since the time of the Goss government
through to the Beattie era. Regardless of changes emerging in the make-up of the
state economy in that time, Queensland continued to exceed the country’s average
growth in all but one year (OESR 2011). While Beattie himself admits that
Queensland remains the world’s largest exporter of coal — which easily repre-
sents our biggest single export item by value — in reality, mining contributes a
much smaller share to the local economy than widely imagined. As the point was
made over 20 years ago by the Nationals’ Mines Minister, Martin Tenni, and cor-
roborated recently by former Treasurer, Joan Sheldon, mineral resource royalties
make up a reasonable part of overall state revenue, but in no way a dominant
part (Queensland Parliament 1989, p. 562; Centre for the Government of
Queensland 2011). In fact, even considering the recent mining boom, mineral
extraction makes up slightly less than 10 per cent of the state’s Gross State
Product compared with the 16 per cent of over 20 years ago. From the beginning
of the Goss period to the end of Beattie’s, agriculture’s GSP share also reduced,
while the services sector grew slightly and became more diverse in its make-up
(ABS 2011a; see Figure 1).
According to the Office of Queensland’s Chief Scientist, about a third of the
state’s value-added economic output is now generated by so-called ‘knowledge-
intensive’ industries such as biotechnology, pharmaceuticals and IT (DPC 2010, 
p. 8). This has come about after an investment by the Beattie government (and
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FIGURE 1
Components of Queensland’s Gross State Product (GSP), by industry (ABS 2011a).
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (2011a).
continuing investment by the Bligh government) of over $3.6 billion in science,
research, industry incentives and what is termed ‘human capital’. To match this
outlay, leveraged business expenditure on research and development increased by
over 160 per cent during the time that Beattie was Premier (Beattie 2010; DPC
2008, p. 2). It must be conceded that these factors started from a low — some-
times tiny — base when compared with primary production factors. But, as it
stands today, and without discounting the continuing part that ‘rocks and crops’
play in the equation, it is not difficult to accept the notion that Queensland’s
economy has evolved into a ‘smarter’ version of what it was prior to the Goss
government’s tenure. Nonetheless, Queensland’s manufacturing sector has not
grown or diversified much in that time, and while the services sector continues to
dominate the state’s overall economic output, most leading services firms (except
perhaps in engineering) are still controlled from other states. Our still apparent
predilection for mining, tourism and, to a decreasing extent, agriculture sees
Queensland very exposed to world economic volatility — a vulnerability that is as
much a feature of Queensland’s economy as it was a generation and more ago.
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